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Abstract
This Essay provides a glimpse into the 34th Economics Institute for
Law Professors, which took place in Estes Park, Colorado, from
June 17 to 27, 2019. The Institute was hosted by the Law &
Economics Center at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George
Mason University, and has been previously attended by more than
850 law professors worldwide. The goal of the Institute is “to help
participants enhance their understanding of economics and broaden
their analytical tools in order to introduce greater economic
sophistication and policy relevance to their professional work.” While
the Institute consisted of forty-two classes spanning ten days, the focus
of this Essay will be on only three of those classes: (1) “Behavioral
Law & Economics,” (2) “There Ain’t No Such Thing as an
Externality,” and (3) “Economics of Innovation and Dynamic
Competition.” For reasons that will hopefully become clear, I have
titled my overview of these classes “Totalitarian Nudges,” “Illusory
Externalities,” and “Utopian Benefits” respectively.
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To regulate more, or regulate less, that is the question:
Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of market fluctuations,
Or to take arms against creative destruction
And by opposing … end it? 1
INTRODUCTION
The Law & Economics Center (“LEC”) at the Antonin Scalia Law School
at George Mason University seeks to ensure that “the public servants who
create and shape laws possess a basic understanding of economic concepts
and methods.” 2 Since 1974, the LEC “has provided the classroom where
federal and state judges, state attorneys general, law professors, and other
legal professionals have been trained in basic economics, accounting,
statistics, regulatory analysis, and related disciplines.” 3 Over “5,000 federal
judges and state court judges representing all 50 states and the District of
Columbia, including three current U.S. Supreme Court Justices, have
participated in at least one of the LEC’s education programs.” 4
The LEC is comprised of six divisions, including the Henry G. Manne
Program in Law & Economics Studies, which “promotes law and
economics scholarship by funding faculty research and hosting policyrelevant research roundtables and academic conferences.” 5 One of the
events hosted by the LEC’s Henry Manne Program is the Economics
Institute for Law Professors. “More than 850 law professors worldwide
have attended the LEC’s Economics Institutes.” 6
This Essay provides a glimpse into the 34th Economics Institute for
Law Professors. While the Institute consisted of forty-two classes
Adapted from William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark,
act 3, sc. 1.
2 About, L. & ECON. CTR., GEO. MASON ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH., https://mason
lec.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Law and Economics Center, L. & ECON. CTR., GEO. MASON ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH.,
https://masonlec.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
6 34th Economics Institute for Law Professors, L. & ECON. CTR., GEO. MASON ANTONIN
SCALIA L. SCH., https://masonlec.org/events/economics-institute/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2020).
1
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spanning ten days, the focus here will be on only three of those classes:
(1) “Behavioral Law & Economics,” (2) “There Ain’t No Such Thing as
an Externality,” and (3) “Economics of Innovation and Dynamic
Competition.” 7 For reasons that will hopefully become clear, I have titled
my overview of these classes Totalitarian Nudges, Illusory Externalities,
and Utopian Benefits respectively. These phrases likely represent my sole
unique contribution to this Essay, but I hope the reader will nonetheless
find my reviews worthwhile.
I. TOTALITARIAN NUDGES
The Behavioral Law & Economics class was taught by Professor
Kathryn Zeiler, Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston
University School of Law. The assigned readings were EYAL ZAMIR &
DORON TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018): Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, and Joshua
D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins,
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 1033 (2012). This
section will focus on the Wright and Ginsburg article.
Most people are familiar with at least some aspects of behavioral
economics, which focuses on decision-making errors people make that
might undermine conclusions of traditional economics founded on
rational actors. In addition, most people are also familiar with the “nudge”
policy application of these insights. While most of the media coverage of
behavioral economics and the “nudge” phenomenon has been positive,
Wright and Ginsburg point out that there are a number of reasons to slow
down the rush to implement the accompanying policies.
Wright and Ginsburg base their critique at least in part on the
following. First, biases documented in experimental laboratory settings
have been shown to dissipate when confronted with real-world market
discipline and incentives. Second, the presence of errors in decisionmaking does not necessitate a conclusion that those errors are irrational,
and behaviorists have failed to make that distinction. Third, behaviorists
fail to account for the costs of policy errors. Fourth, once behaviorists
dismiss revealed preferences as indicative of welfare, it becomes extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to justify a policy maker’s determination of
“true” preferences as deserving any particular deference. Fifth, even
assuming all the foregoing criticisms are misplaced, behaviorists fail to
account for the cost of denying individuals process freedom. Sixth and
7 See generally, Thirty-Fourth Economics Institute for Law Professors Agenda, L. & ECON.
CTR., GEO. MASON ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH., https://masonlec.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/07/Agenda-Mason-LEC-34th-Economics-Institute-for-Law-ProfessorsJune-2019.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
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finally, behaviorists fail to account for the risk of paternalistic government
intervention in individual decision-making creating a slippery-slope to
more pervasive and coercive government regulation of individual liberty.
Each of these criticisms will be examined in more detail (albeit still briefly)
below.
A. Documented Biases Dissipate when Confronted with
Market Discipline and Incentives
Wright and Ginsburg note that “much if not most of the data
suggesting cognitive biases affect individual decisionmaking are drawn
from experimental settings and the bias has not been shown to persist in
the presence of market institutions.” 8 For example, “Charles Plott and
Kathryn Zeiler demonstrate that observed gaps [between willingness-toaccept and willingness-to-pay] 9 can be explained by misconceptions about
experimental protocols and the experimental task; when those
misconceptions are dispelled and a full set of experimental controls is
employed to eliminate them, contrary to prospect theory, such gaps
disappear.” 10 In addition, findings from other studies “suggest framing

8 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins,
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (2012) (citing
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 31, 51 (2011)).
9 Cf. Wright & Ginsburg, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1042 (“The key experimental finding
of prospect theory is that individuals are, in many cases, reluctant to sell a good endowed
to them when offered a sum greater than they are willing to pay to acquire the good.”)
(citing Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. Econ. Behav.
& Org. 39, 43-44 (1980); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless
Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. Econ. 1039, 1041-42 (1991)).10 Wright
& Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1046–47 (citing Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange
Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?,
97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1454-56 (2007); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The
Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and
Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 532–35 (2005)).
10 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1046–47 (citing Charles R. Plott & Kathryn
Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and
Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1454-56 (2007); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn
Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject
Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530,
532–35 (2005)).
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effects can be reduced or eliminated at low cost without the extensive
interventions proposed by libertarian paternalists.” 11
B. Behaviorists have Failed to Account for Rational Errors
Wright and Ginsburg note that even if robust evidence of irrationality
in markets existed, “such evidence would have to be interpreted with care;
the challenge would be to distinguish truly irrational behavior from
rationally made and therefore efficient mistakes.” 12 They go on to explain
that “efficient mistakes” occur when “rational economic actors economize
on both information and transaction costs. In short, not all errors imply
irrationality because perfect decisionmaking would be costly.” 13
Unfortunately, “behavioral law and economics literature . . . fails to
distinguish between rational and irrational errors, assuming instead that
error reduction is always efficient.” 14
By way of example, Wright and Ginsburg take on the assertion that
“consumers consistently underestimate their future borrowing due to a
potpourri of behavioral biases such as imperfect self-control, hyperbolic
discounting, and systematic underestimation of the probability of negative
consequences.” 15 They go on to note that this “predatory lender”
interpretation of the credit market “gives rise to several testable
hypotheses about the underlying behavioral theories.” 16 However, the
relevant data “bear out none of these expectations.” 17 Rather, “[t]he
available data strongly suggest consumers make rational choices in the
credit card market.” 18 While there are error rates, “the upper bound of the
Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1048 (citing Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian
Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (2005)). Cf. id. at 1035 (“the
behavioral law and economics regulatory agenda reflects a common philosophical source-so-called libertarian paternalism. That seemingly oxymoronic phrase . . . is intended to
describe legal interventions that . . . increase the individual’s economic welfare by freeing
him from the limitations of his cognitive biases . . . without limiting his choices”).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1049.
15 Id. (citing Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004)).
16 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1049 (offering three “testable hypotheses
about the underlying behavioral theories.”). These hypotheses are: “First, we should
expect to see a significant majority of consumers selecting the wrong card-that is, the
card that does not maximize interest-cost savings net of any annual fee paid. Second, we
should expect the consumers’ error rate, if it is the product of irrationality, to remain
invariant to the cost of the error. Third, we should expect consumers who carry monthly
balances instead of paying them off to hold cards with high rewards and no annual
fee.” Id.
17 Id. at 1050 (citing Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?
(Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=843826.).
18 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1050.
11
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initial error rate suggests switching costs would outweigh any potential
gains consumers might realize from changing cards,” and thus “the error
rate is efficient.” 19
Nonetheless, as Wright and Ginsburg explain, Elizabeth Warren’s
asserts that “[a] high error rate implies irrationality, and irrationality implies
the need for choice-reducing regulation.” 20 Unfortunately, this “leap from
identifying the error rate . . . illustrates what Harold Demsetz famously
called the Nirvana Fallacy – the failure to ask: compared to what?” 21 This
fallacy “threatens to subject consumers to a serious policy error by
conflating rational choice with irrational behavior––that is, by ignoring
switching and other costs incurred everywhere except in Nirvana – and by
avoiding comparative institutional analysis.” 22
C. Behaviorists Fail to Account for the Costs of Policy Errors
As Wright and Ginsburg put it:
The inevitability of policy errors derives from the
insurmountable theoretical and empirical obstacles to
identifying any one person’s, let alone the distribution of all
persons’, “true preferences.” One type of policy error will occur
when a behavioral intervention is aimed at seemingly irrational
behavior that is in fact rational for the decisionmaker in
question . . . . A second type of policy error will occur when an
intervention designed to improve the decisionmaking of truly
irrational economic agents imposes costs, as it inevitably will,
upon all those who are not irrational and for whom the same
decision is not an error. 23

Given this inevitability of error on the side of government
intervention, and the concomitant costs generated by these errors, it
should be obvious that one can only claim behaviorist interventions are
efficient if one accounts for these expected costs. Put another way, “the
question remains whether the social costs saved are greater than the social

Id. (citing Elizabeth Warren, Economic Model Almost Working or Broken?, Credit Slips
(Dec. 26, 2006, 04:12 PM) (http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2006/12/economic
_model_.html).
20 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1051 (citing Elizabeth Warren, Economic Model
Almost Working or Broken?, Credit Slips (Dec. 26, 2006, 4:12 PM), https://www.credit
slips.org/creditslips/2006/12/economic_model_.html).
21 Id. (citing Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 1–3 (1969)).
22 Id. at 1051–52.
23 Id. at 1052. Cf. id. at 1061 (“After ruling out revealed preferences as expressions
of true preferences, the behaviorist lacks a coherent principle to identify welfaremaximizing choices.”).
19
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costs of intervention.” 24 Without addressing this question, one runs the
risk of the proposed cure being worse than the asserted harm. However,
Wright and Ginsburg argue that an “expanding behavioral law and
economics agenda largely disregards these risks.” 25
D. Who Decides a Person’s “True” Preferences?
As Wright and Ginsburg point out, “behavioral law and economics’
claim to welfare-increasing intervention requires one to disregard the
neoclassical assumption that actual behavior reveals evidence of
welfare.” 26 If, as the behaviorists’ argument goes, the preferences revealed
by actual choices are “irrational” because they are distorted by various
cognitive biases, then the claim is that, but for those biases, the individual
would prefer different options, and this latter choice would be the
individual’s “true” preference. Government intervention is then justified
to help individuals reach their true preferences. This approach, however,
raises the question: “How then do behavioral economists identify true
preferences?” 27
One approach advanced by behaviorists is to posit multiple selves
“with conflicting interests owing to different time perspectives.” 28
However, “[e]conomics does not provide a basis for identifying which of
the multiple selves’ decisions expresses the individual’s ‘true’ preferences
for the purposes of welfare analysis.” 29 Ultimately:
After ruling out revealed preferences as expressions of true
preferences, the behaviorist lacks a coherent principle to identify
welfare-maximizing choices. Indeed, without revealed
preferences, economic science simply cannot do so. The
behaviorists can only declare by fiat what they expect a rational
individual would or should do – thereby justifying the
imposition of correct choices by a third party, contrary to the
behaviorist promise to maximize economic welfare by the
individuals’ own lights and undermining the behaviorist claim
to the prefix “libertarian.” 30

In other words, it is the paternalism that ultimately takes precedence for
those advocating libertarian paternalism.

Id. at 1052–53.
Id. at 1053.
26 Id. at 1060.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1061–62.
24
25
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E. The Cost of Denying Individuals Process Freedom
Amartya Sen has written about “the process aspect of freedom,”
which includes:
(i) decisional autonomy of the choices to be made, and (ii)
immunity from interference by others. The former is concerned
with the operative role that a person has in the process of
choice, and the crucial issue here is self-decision, e.g., whether
the choices are being made by the person herself––not (on her
behalf) by other individuals or institutions. 31

Wright and Ginsburg argue that behaviorists “in general do not place
any value upon the ‘the process aspect of freedom’ or ‘decisional
autonomy.’” 32 This is concerning, at least in part, because “[l]imiting the
range of decisions to be made by individuals or burdening those who
would make an officially disfavored choice--not saving enough, eating
unhealthful foods, etc.--tends to infantilize the public.” 33 By way of
evidence to support this proposition, Wright and Ginsburg point to data
on rates of entrepreneurship in formerly communist countries. As they
put it, “we would expect people who were raised in a paternalistic state,
and hence relieved of the need to make many important decisions for
themselves, to have less well-developed decisionmaking skills and to be
more risk averse.” 34
In general, “entrepreneurs . . . exhibit a particular mode of
information processing, or cognitive style.” They are more alert
to opportunities that require linking previously unrelated
information. Indeed, the experimental literature strongly tends
to validate Israel Kirzner’s description of the Austrian tradition,
which “postulates a tendency for profit opportunities to be
discovered and grasped by routine-resisting entrepreneurial market
participants.”
In a socialist state, however, resistance is futile. Uncritical
acceptance of the party line is essential to survival, much less
advancement. Of course, there are choices to be made: Shall I
read Pravda or Izvestia? Yet the choice set has been limited by
the state in a way that serves the state’s ends, not those of the
individual. As Milan Simecka so graphically recounted from his
personal experience after the Prague Spring of 1968, the
Amartya Sen, Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism
in Promoting Individual Freedoms, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 519, 523–24 (1993) (as quoted
in Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1069).
32 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1069.
33 Id. at 1070.
34 Id. at 1073.
31
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Communist Party of Czechoslovakia controlled the citizenry by
depriving individuals of their decisional autonomy in only three
respects: The state determined their housing, their occupation,
and their children’s education. That is why this professor of
mathematics in mid-career became an operator of construction
equipment. 35

And relevant data appears to bear out the authors’ concerns:
Transnational comparisons using data from the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor produce strong evidence that, even
after controlling for relevant variables, all countries with a
communist past have a lower rate of entrepreneurship activity
than do other countries. A recent study concludes that even now
those unfortunate countries have “low levels of entrepreneurial
human capital that have been engendered by decades of
existence under a central planning system that tended to blunt
individual incentives.” As one would expect, however, the level
of entrepreneurship is “significantly lower in Russia.” A study
conducted jointly by Russian and U.S. scholars concludes that
“[t]he absence of freedom of decision-making in the most
important resource – the workforce – and the ‘no-choice’
employment situation were two fundamental obstacles to the
development of entrepreneurship” during the communist era.
After the fall of communism, moreover, Russian entrepreneurs
tended to be younger than was typical elsewhere; only the young
were unscathed by their nation’s paternalistic history. 36

F. A Slippery-Slope to More Coercive Government Regulation
of Individual Liberty
As Wright and Ginsburg note, “of course, no proponent of regulation
based upon the findings of behavioral economics espouses a regime
remotely as encompassing and restrictive as even the least oppressive of
the late, unlamented communist regimes.” 37 Nonetheless, “there is reason

Id. at 1073–74 (quoting Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law
Can Do About It, 28 Comp. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 819 (2007); Israel M. Kirzner,
Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON.
LIT. 60, 71 (1997)) (citing MILAN SIMECKA, RESTORATION OF ORDER: THE
NORMALIZATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1969–1976 (A.G. Brain trans., 1984)).
36 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1074–75 (quoting Martin Robson, Explaining
Cross-National Variations in Entrepreneurship: The Role of Social Protection and Political Culture,
28 Comp. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 863, 890 (2007); Ruta Aidis et al., Institutions and
Entrepreneurship Development in Russia: A Comparative Perspective, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 656,
657, 670 (2008); Alexander I. Ageev et al., Entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union and PostSocialist Russia, 7 SMALL BUS. ECON. 365, 369 (1995)).
37 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1075 (citation omitted).
35
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to believe . . . they would put us on a slippery slope – or push us that much
further down the slope than we have already slid.” 38
To begin, “[p]aternalistic policies are, by nature, likely to be slippery”
because they “are expressed in regulations specifically adopted, at least
initially, for the benefit of those regulated and, if those individuals do not
want to be regulated for their own good – which is hardly unusual – the
regulators will likely deem ever more stringent measures necessary.” 39 In
addition, “regulatory missions tend to expand; ‘mission creep’ assures that
the government agency will require more money and more staff over time,
forestalling any danger of the agency accomplishing its mission and
becoming redundant.” 40
Finally, while this section began with the proposition that “no
proponent of regulation based upon the findings of behavioral economics
espouses . . . communist regimes,” 41 a qualification may be in order.
Specifically, Wright and Ginsburg draw a line from the Critical Legal
Studies (“CLS”) movement to at least some modern behaviorists.
Beginning with CLS, Wright and Ginsburg argue:
Overtly a leftist movement, CLS turned out to be little more
than a warmed-over species of Marxism, as it had evolved in
the hothouse of radical European social theorists such as
Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, and others of the
Frankfurt School of neo-Marxist critical theorists, Antonio
Gramsci, a leader of the Communist Party in Italy, and Michel
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and other “poststructuralist”
philosophers. The self-declared purpose of the CLS movement
was “to provide a critique of liberal legal and political
philosophy” that would show the “liberal embrace of the rule
of law is actually incompatible with other essential principles of
liberal political thinking. 42

Particularly noteworthy in terms of connecting CLS to the
behaviorists is the concept of “false consciousness.” 43 Again, here are
Wright and Ginsburg:
Id. Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalistic Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 411, 412 (2007).
39 Id. (“[F]ederal laws protecting the occupants of automobiles provide a familiar
historical example.”).
40 Id. at 1076 (citing Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1,
3 (2002); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 117 (1987)).
41 Id. at 1075.
42 Id. at 1082 (quoting ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL
CRITIQUE 3 (1990)) (citations omitted).
43 Wright and Ginsburg note that the phrase “false consciousness” is often attributed
to Marx, but the “phrase, if not the concept, seems actually to derive from an early
38
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Key to the CLS analysis was the notion of “false
consciousness,” meaning the “holding of false or inaccurate
beliefs that are contrary to one’s own social interest and which
thereby contribute to the maintenance of the disadvantaged
position of the self or the group.” Like the presumed gap
between revealed preferences and “true preferences,” assuming
a wedge between reality and the perceptions of others provides
a space to be filled by some combination of reeducation and
outright coercion. Duncan Kennedy encapsulates these Maoist
tendencies in his proposal that professors and janitors at the
Harvard Law School be required to trade places for one month
each year. Kennedy described the ultimate goal of CLS as
“building a left bourgeois intelligentsia that might one day join
together with a mass movement for the radical transformation
of American society. 44

Wright and Ginsburg go on to argue that the “end of the communist
era in Russia and Eastern Europe dealt a blow to CLS, as it did to all leftist
movements. The worldwide triumph of socialism, which had long seemed
inevitable to so many, now seemed more improbable than ever.” 45
Eventually, continue Wright and Ginsburg, at least some of these scholars
found a new home in behavioral law and economics, where “more than
sophomoric understanding of economics was not required,” 46 and which
“shares with CLS the paternalistic premise that the poor wretches to be
benefitted by the insights of their governors suffer from a form of ‘false
consciousness.’” 47
II. ILLUSORY EXTERNALITIES
The class titled “There Ain’t No Such Thing as an Externality,” was
taught by Terry Anderson, John and Jean DeNault Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution, Stanford University. The assigned reading was TERRY
L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, Property Rights for the Common Pool, in
translation of a letter Friedrich Engels wrote to Franz Mehring.” Wright & Ginsburg,
supra note 8, at 1082 n.230 (citing MICHÈLE BARRETT, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH: FROM
MARX TO FOUCAULT 5-6 (1991)); cf. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1088 n.232 (“As
one student of Kennedy’s put it, the phrase ‘implies that all those who disagree with you
are stupid.’”) (quoting RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 166 (1999)).
44 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1082–83 (quoting John T. Jost, Negative Illusions:
Conceptual Clarification and Psychological Evidence Concerning False Consciousness, 16 POL.
PSYCHOL. 397, 400 (1995); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of
Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 610 (1982)).
45 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1083.
46 Id. at 1084.
47 Id. at 1085.
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ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
Economists generally advocate for free market exchange as the
efficient way to organize an economy. This preference can be understood
to rest at least in part on the proposition that individuals know best what
they value and are therefore best positioned to maximize the benefits of
exchange. A corollary of this is that economists generally consider
government intervention in the market inefficient because the
interventions are likely to distort incentives in a way that results in a suboptimal allocation of resources. However, even economists who generally
favor free markets typically accept certain justifications for government
interference in markets, including: (1) externalities, (2) public goods, (3)
information asymmetries, and (4) monopolies. 48
Externalities are understood to be costs (and benefits) that are not
internalized by the producer. Given that capitalism rests on the
proposition that free market exchange will lead to efficient resource
allocation in response to pricing signals, a failure on the part of producers
to internalize their costs leads to inefficient allocation of resources. Thus,
so the argument goes, externalities might justify government intervention. 49
However, if we consider that “externalities” are simply a manifestation of
a failure to assign property rights, then, when feasible and under certain
conditions, assigning property rights would allow for efficient trading. 50
This would certainly undermine the justification for government
intervention based on externalities. At least some of the key propositions
here are as follows:
First, to assert that Person A is imposing a cost on Person B, and that
this cost should be internalized by Person A, assumes that Person B has a
right to be free of the asserted imposition. However, this assumption may
not be able to bear the weight sought to be placed upon it by advocates of
regulation in the name of externalities. 51 As Anderson puts it:
48 Cf. ANDERSON & LIBECAP, Property Rights for the Common Pool, in
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH at 54 n.3 (“[W]e combine
most government interventions - regulation, tax, subsidies, and related technology and
performance standards together as Coase did in describing them as the ‘Pigouvian
Tradition.’”) (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 39,
54 n.3 (1960)).
49 It could be the case that the government “fix” to internalize an externality is costlier
than the externality itself. Additionally, there are alternative, market-based solutions to
internalize externalities.
50 This is the fundamental insights of Ronald Coase’s seminal article on externalities
and property rights. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42–
44 (1960).
51 See TERRY L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 56 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (“[T]he conventional
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[D]eclaring that person A’s use of a resource creates an
externality for person B complicates creating environmental
markets by assuming that person B has a right to be free of the
costs of A’s use. If such a right existed, Coase asks why B is not
requiring compensation from A for A’s imposition of a cost on
B. Why is there no market transaction? If the answer is that B
does not have such a right, then the question is why B is not
paying A to cease creating the cost? In summary, if there is a
missing market because property rights are not defined, then
there is a possibility for a market solution if they can be
established. 52
Alternatively, one might frame the issue as one of reciprocal costs:
Coase argued that property rights assign benefits and costs and
promote bargaining, but his emphasis on the reciprocal nature
of costs, is underappreciated. To see the relevance of reciprocal
costs . . . , consider one of Coase’s parables, the conflict between
the doctor whose practice depends on quiet and the
confectioner whose candy production generates noise. If these
two activities are located adjacent to one another, there will be
conflict for use of the airspace as a medium for transmission of
sound waves. The question is whether the doctor has a right to
produce medical services in a quiet environment or whether the
confectioner has a right to produce candy and in the process
generate sound and vibration. Coase’s point was that costs to
one party are a benefit to the other and vice versa. 53

Either way, the point is that there is good reason to push back on bald
assertions to the effect that Person A is imposing a cost on Person B, and
that therefore regulation is required to ensure Person A internalizes the
cost of their activities.
Second, even assuming that we are justified in claiming that Person A
is creating an externality as understood in the conventional sense, there is
reason to question whether government intervention is obviously
preferable to market- or bargaining-based solutions. Again, quoting
Anderson:
Our contention is that as much attention should be given to
political economy issues associated with “government failure,” as
are given to ‘market failure.’ Recognition of the transaction costs

approach diverts attention from the questions of why property rights do not exist and
whether government instruments would still be preferable if rights could be established.”).
52 Id. at 63; see also id. at 68 (“Perhaps no other lesson is associated more with Coase
than the idea of bargaining to resolve conflicting demands for resources.”).
53 Id. at 61–62.
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of government action will lead to examination of a larger range
of policies that includes more local and private market solutions. 54

Anderson’s point is similar to the point that Wright and Ginsburg make
when invoking the Nirvana Fallacy: while markets might produce certain
inefficiencies—so do proposed alternatives such as government
intervention.
Finally, granting government the role of assigning property rights and
setting various “rules of the game” to reduce transaction costs does not
undermine a pro-market bargaining approach as hypocritical. Anderson
acknowledges that “recognition of common property and definition and
enforcement of formal property rights involves government intervention,
and there will be politics involved in that process as well.” 55 However,
“once the rights are recognized, agents can devise solutions through
markets.” 56
III. UTOPIAN BENEFITS
The class on the “Economics of Innovation and Dynamic
Competition” was taught by Prof. John Yun, and the assigned readings
were Ginsburg & Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 1 (2012), and BAUMOL ET AL., GOOD
CAPITALISM, BAD CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND
PROSPERITY 15–59 (2007).
The general consensus is that monopolies are bad at least in part
because they create what is often referred to as “deadweight loss.”
Deadweight loss refers to the loss of consumer and producer welfare
attributable to the monopolist’s expected use of pricing power to
maximize its profit at the expense of consumers. In order to better
understand this, we need to first understand what is expected under a
model of perfect competition.
In perfect competition, prices are determined by the interaction of
supply and demand. Consumers typically demand more quantity of a
product as its price goes down. In the standard supply-and-demand model,
this is represented by a demand curve that slopes downward to the right,
with price on the vertical Y-axis, while quantity is on the horizontal X-axis.
Thus, the quantity demanded is low when the price is high, and high when
the price is low. On the other hand, producers are typically incentivized to
increase output as price increases. This is represented via an upwardsloping supply curve, which crosses the downward-sloping demand curve
at some point.
Id. at 56–57 n.9.
Id. at 57 n.10.
56 Id.
54
55
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The point at which the demand and supply curves cross (the
“Equilibrium Point”) is typically understood to provide us with the
efficient price and quantity of a product (specifically, we draw a horizontal
line from the intersect point to the price, and a vertical line to the
quantity). 57 One way of understanding this is to assume that any producer
that tries to charge more than the equilibrium price will lose the
competition for customers to the producers selling the same product for
less, while any producer that tries to undercut the competition by charging
less than the equilibrium will be failing to maximize its profit, which is
typically unsustainable because, among other things, investors and
employers will eventually depart for the companies able to provide higher
salaries and better returns. 58
The equilibrium price/quantity creates both consumer and producer
surplus. Consumer surplus is created because the area below the demand
curve but above the price line represents consumers who would have paid
more for the product. In other words, these consumers received more
value than they paid for. Meanwhile, the area below the price line but above
the supply curve represents producer surplus in that producers would have
been willing to sell for less at those quantities but received more. The
perfect competition model is set forth in Diagram 1.
Diagram 1 59

57 See generally Economic efficiency, KHAN ACADEMY, https://www.khanacademy.org/
economics-finance-domain/microeconomics/consumer-producer-surplus/deadweightloss-tutorial/a/demand-supply-and-efficiency-cnx (defining economic efficiency).
58 Cf. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of
Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 13 (2012) (“because economic theory teaches
that successful predatory pricing depends upon the firm incurring certain losses in the
present and somehow more than recouping those losses in the future, it is regarded as an
unlikely business practice”).
59 File:Economic-surpluses.svg, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, https://commons.wikimedia
.org/wiki/File:Economic-surpluses.svg.
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In the case of a monopoly, however, there are no competitors to
discipline the monopolist—either by undercutting an excessive price, or
by punishing a failure to maximize profit. This allows the monopolist to
produce less, and charge more, than would otherwise be expected. The
new price/quantity (“Pm” & “Qm”) will be determined by the intersection
of the marginal revenue (“MR”) and marginal cost (“MC”) of the
monopolist. The details of how these new curves MC and MR interact to
determine the optimal price/quantity from the perspective of the
monopolist is beyond the scope of this essay, but the graphical
representation is set forth in Diagram 2 below. 60 Importantly for our
purposes, while there remains consumer and producer surplus (with the
balance unsurprisingly shifting in favor of the producer), there has been a
loss of overall social welfare, and this is represented by the deadweight
loss in Diagram 2.
Price

Diagram 2 61
Consumer surplus

D
Deadweight loss

Pm
Pc

MC
Producer
surplus

MR
Qm

Qc

Quantity

In light of the foregoing, government intervention is arguably
warranted to restore efficient competition and thereby restore the lost social

See generally Motley Fool Staff, What Is The Relationship Between Marginal Revenue and
Marginal Cost as a Company Increases Output, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 1, 2016, 11:05 PM),
https://www.fool.com/knowledge-center/the-relationship-between-marginal-revenuemarginal.aspx (explaining the interaction between marginal revenue curves and marginal
cost curves).
61 File: Monopoly-surpluses.svg, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, https://commons.wikimedia
.org/w/index.php?curid=5224373
60
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welfare. However, there is reason to pause before accepting this analysis. As
I stated in a blog post titled “Deadweight Loss or Utopian Benefit?” 62:
[T]his analysis is based on comparing the expected behavior of
a monopolist with a static model of perfect competition. One
of the problems with using a static model is that it fails to take
into account where we’ve been or where we’re actually likely to
go. A more dynamic view might prompt questions such as, “If
monopoly pricing power didn’t exist, would we ever get the
innovation that creates monopoly power in the first place?” Or,
“If perfect competition rarely, if ever, exists in the real world,
why are we using it as a benchmark for regulation?” Put another
way, does it really make sense to regulate away the incentive to
innovate that is created by monopoly pricing power (and the
accompanying consumer and producer surplus) merely because
we theorize that if we lived in the magical world of perfect
competition we’d have even more surplus? 63

In light of the foregoing, it might “be better to use ‘utopian benefit’
rather than ‘deadweight loss’ to describe the difference between what we
get with monopoly pricing as opposed to what we’d expect to get with
perfect competition.” 64 Such a change could make sense because it is
“natural to react to a ‘loss’ of surplus as something that should be made
up, corrected, or restored – but calls to put innovation at risk in order to
pursue a ‘utopian benefit’ might lead to more appropriate caution and
humility when it comes to regulation.” 65
Having said all that, the law already takes much of this into account.
As Ginsburg and Wright point out:
[T]he principle that neither monopoly profits nor monopoly
pricing is unlawful under the Sherman Act implicitly but
necessarily involves the presumption that the dynamic benefits
from innovation and from “competition for the market” will
outweigh the deadweight losses emphasized in static analysis. In
the Trinko case Justice Scalia made the connection to dynamic
considerations explicit when he observed not only that charging
monopoly prices is lawful but also that “[t]he opportunity to
charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking
that produces innovation and economic growth.” In this
example, the presumption of dynamic benefits from innovation
Stefan J. Padfield, Deadweight Loss or Utopian Benefit?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (June 22,
2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2019/06/deadweight-loss-orutopian-benefit.html.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
62
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and the introduction of new products takes the form of a rule
of per se legality with respect to firm pricing decisions. 66

Nonetheless, the next time you hear that monopolies are bad because
they create deadweight loss, it might still be helpful to rephrase that
statement to say instead that monopolies may be bad because they may
deny us utopian benefits.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay I have attempted to give a glimpse into the 34th
Economics Institute for Law Professors. The three classes I chose to focus
on constitute less than 10 percent of the total, and I have only covered
isolated parts of those classes. Thus, the reader should not assume they
now have anything approaching a complete picture of the Institute.
The theme I have focused on here is one of questioning widely held
assumptions generally understood to support government intervention in
markets. The specific areas addressed were behavioral law and economics,
externalities, and monopoly pricing power. While not decisive, the points
raised in this Essay have the potential to add useful perspectives to the
ongoing debate about government regulation of markets.

66

Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 58, at 6.

